ABSTRACT Mobile user authentication is an essential topic to consider in the current communications technology due to greater deployment of handheld devices and advanced technologies. Memon et al. recently proposed an efficient and secure two-factor authentication protocol for location-based services using asymmetric key cryptography. Unlike their claims, the vigilant analysis of this paper substantiates that Memon et al.'s protocol has quite a few limitations such as vulnerability to key compromised impersonation attack, insecure password changing phase, imperfect mutual authentication, and vulnerability to insider attack. Furthermore, this paper proposes an enhanced secure authentication protocol for roaming services on elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol is also a two-factor authentication protocol and is suitable for practical applications due to the composition of light-weight operations. The proposed protocol's formal security is verified using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool to certify that the proposed protocol is free from security threats. The informal and formal security analyses along with the performance analysis sections determine that the proposed protocol performs better than Memon et al.'s protocol and other related protocols in terms of security and efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile device is an indispensable part of daily life among human beings due to the extensive range of applications such as voice communication and text messages. Progressively mobile devices are furnished with Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and GPS features that allows to connect with other devices, internet and location based services. Besides, new security challenges are also mounting in conjunction with the evolution of mobile computing technologies. For instance, if a user discloses his location through any public network, others can easily trace his/her movements. The data communication over insecure channels undoubtedly brings into question the privacy and integrity of conversation. The extensive deployment of handheld electronic devices, networks, mobility and flexibility necessitates the authentication process of every remote user. Mobile user authentication verifies the identity of user through a mobile device and permits access to the network services. The user authentication process through different means, namely passwords, smartcards and biometrics, is possible due to the provision of built-in advanced technologies in the mobile devices [1] - [3] . For example, Android supports face recognition and Apple supports fingerprint recognition. The user authentication ensures the legitimacy of only the user but not the network service provider. The chances of attacks still exists when the user is unsure about the second party. Therefore, assuring the authenticity of all communicating parties is pretty much crucial, which is called mutual authentication [4] .
In the mobile architecture, mutual authentication with keyagreement protocol affords the authentication between user and foreign agent via home agent, and enables both to generate a communal session-key to encrypt further conversation through insecure networks. During the past decade, various authors have put forward diverse authentication protocols for mobile and wireless computing architecture [5] - [24] . Yet, mobile devices have got very less computational sources, power, and time. These constraints have been driving mobile devices towards light-weight cryptosystems instead of widely implemented traditional public key cryptosystems [1] , [24] . The first anonymous authentication protocol for wireless environments using smartcards was proposed by Zhu and Ma [24] in the year 2004. Their protocol achieves authentication with just one round of message communication while keeping the mobile user remaining anonymous. In 2006, Lee et al. [12] proved that Zhu et al. ' s protocol cannot offer perfect user anonymity and backward secrecy, then they proposed an enhancement over Zhu et al.' s protocol. Unfortunately, Wu et al. [19] in 2008 analyzed Lee et al. ' s protocol and showed drawbacks similar to Zhu et al.'s protocol; they further suggested a secure anonymous authentication protocol. Nevertheless, Mun et al. [17] found two flaws such as failure to provide perfect forward secrecy and vulnerability to password guessing attack in Wu et al.'s protocol. Mun et al. [17] also put forward an enhanced authentication protocol for global mobility networks. However, Zhao et al. [22] in 2014 and Reddy et al. [18] in 2016 presented several weaknesses in Mun et al. ' s protocol such as vulnerability to impersonation attack, replay attack, denial-of-service attack, privileged insider attack, lack of user anonymity, lack of pre-authentication in the smartcard, and improper mutual authentication. Zhao et al. [22] also proposed an improved authentication protocol over the Mun et al.'s protocol. Yet in 2015, Memon et al. [16] proposed an anonymous authentication protocol for location based services using elliptic curve cryptography and asymmetric key cryptography. They claimed that their protocol can withstand all the attacks and provides user anonymity.
The cryptanalysis section of this paper evidences that Memon et al.'s protocol [16] contains limitations such as vulnerability to key compromised impersonation attack, insider attack, insecure password changing phase, and imperfect mutual authentication. Nevertheless, this paper proposes an improved light-weight authentication protocol for mobile services using elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol is also a two-factor authentication protocol and is suitable for practical applications due to the composition of lightweight operations. It also overcomes the security pitfalls discussed in cryptanalysis of Memon et al.'s [16] protocol. The proposed protocol's formal security is verified using AVISPA tool [25] to certify that the proposed protocol is free from security threats. The informal and formal security analyses and performance analysis sections substantiates that the proposed protocol is efficient and robust compared to Memon et al.'s protocol.
A. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The proposed protocol for roaming services considers mutual authentication of entities, key agreement between entities, anonymity, integrity, prevention from over collection and resistance to several attacks. The security requirements of the proposed protocol are defined as following:
Mutual authentication: Both parties of the communication should verify each other without disclosing their original identities over public channels.
Key agreement: The communicating parties should make a symmetric session-key in order to encrypt their subsequent conversations.
Anonymity: The identities of the parties should remain unknown to the adversaries throughout the process. Thus, adversaries could not trace the actions of users.
Prevention from over collection: Home agent should be on familiar terms with merely adequate information of mobile users.
Integrity: The transmitting messages through insecure channels are unaltered by adversaries and should be verifiable at the receiving parties.
Resistance to several attacks: The protocol should withstand all the security threats for instance replay attack, impersonation attack, man-in-middle attack, insider attack, stolen smartcard attack and so on. Step 1: SC→BTS:
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
, where c is another random number and K MF is current session key. Now, SC sends {C * MF , c · P, V MF1 } to BTS.
Step 2: BTS→SC:
. MC authenticates BTS, if the condition holds. Now, SC updates the session key to K * MF .
D. PASSWORD CHANGING PHASE
In this phase, MC can change existing pw MC without the contribution of LBS as below:
Step 
. It is obvious that C # MF holds and BTS treats AE as genuine MC, but actually it is talking to an adversary. In this way, AE can masquerade as a legitimate MC and obtain all the valuable information of MC.
B. IMPERFECT MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION FOR SUBSEQUENT LOGINS
Memon et al.'s protocol cannot attain perfect mutual authentication among MC and LBS for subsequent logins due to possession of wrong value in its stored database as described here.
Step 1 Step 2: 
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section puts forward a secure mutual authentication with key agreement protocol for mobile services on elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol encompasses three parties: MU, FA and HA. During the initialization process, each FA will receive a long term secret key K FH from HA, where Table 2 shows the notations of the proposed protocol. 
A. MOBILE USER REGISTRATION PHASE
A new MU can register at HA and subsequently access the network facilities as shown in Fig. 1 .
D. SESSION KEY UPDATING PHASE BETWEEN MU AND FA
This section shows how MU and FA can update their sessionkey when MU is remain under same FA's zone.
Step 1: SC→FA: 
V. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
The informal security analysis of the proposed protocol is demonstrated here by relating individual security feature.
A. USER ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY
The entire communication of the proposed protocol is remain anonymous over public channels as outlined here. 
Then, HA gives negative acknowledgement to FA and drops the request. In the similar manner, R B = y · P is also protected from man-in-middle attack and replay attack by incorporating in
, where y varies for each session.
C. STOLEN SMARTCARD ATTACKS
Though extracting sensitive information from smartcard is highly complicated, but not impossible [26] - [28] . Assume that AE acquires the stored parameters such as {ID HA , C MU , 
E. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
AE has the possibility of gaining access to the network by impersonating a legitimate MU. This can be perpetrated using stolen credentials or by finding a way around the authentication process. In order to attain the network access, AE is expected to pass through the login phase and authentication phase. During the login phase, SC verifies the condition = h(PID MU ||B MU ) verifies the correctness of all entered credentials. The system may terminate and cannot permit to access for a while after certain number of wrong entries.
H. PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACKS
During the user registration phase, MU submits only A MU = h(PW MU ||b) and PID MU = h(ID MU ||b) to HA instead of ID MU and PW MU in plaintext format. On the other hand, the entire authentication process takes place by verifying the equivalence of received messages with the computed values. Accordingly, HA is not necessitated to maintain user verification tables. Consequently, an insider cannot obtain the MU's login information resulting in the proposed protocol safer from insider attack. To compute session key, he/she require R B too, where R B = x · R B = y · R M . Though R B and R M values are known to AE, he/she cannot find out either x or y to compute R B due to its elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem (ECDLP) nature. Hence, the proposed protocol can resist session key compromised attack.
J. FORWARD SECRECY
During the key-agreement phase, the session key is computed as SK = h(R B ||ID HA ||ID FA ). The involved parameter in R B = x · R B in the session key is dynamic for every login and does not consist the long-term private keys. Though either the previous session key or the long-term private key compromises with the adversary, he/she cannot compute the current session key. Therefore, the proposed protocol provides perfect forward secrecy.
VI. SIMULATION FOR FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS USING AVISPA TOOL
This section presents the formal security verification of the proposed protocol using Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) tool. We first introduce AVISPA tool, then the implementation features and finally the analysis of the simulation results.
A. OVERVIEW OF AVISPA
AVISPA is a push-button tool used to formally verify the robustness and efficiency of a cryptographic protocol [7] , [25] , [28] - [31] . An internet security protocol in AVISPA is implemented using High Level Protocols Specification Language (HLPSL) [32] , [33] . The basic roles in HLPSL implementation are used to characterize each participant role, and composition roles for signifying scenarios VOLUME 4, 2016 of basic roles. The role system comprises the number of sessions, principals and roles.
An intruder (i) in HLPSL is demonstrated using the Dolev-Yao model [34] where i can take part as an authentic role. HLPSL deploys HLPSL2IF translation to convert to the intermediate format (IF) . IF supports one of the four back-ends such as On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). These back-ends are described in [35] . IF uses one of the above four back-ends in order to generate the output format (OF). OF comprises of following sections [35] :
• SUMMARY: It enlightens whether the tested protocol is secure, insecure, or the test is indecisive.
• DETAILS: It clarifies what conditions of the test have been considered to declare the protocol is safe or prone to attacks or the test is indecisive.
• PROTOCOL: It indicates the protocol name.
• GOAL: It specifies the goal of test.
• BACKEND: It denotes the back-end name used in the test.
• COMMENTS & STATISTICS: It usually displays the trace of an attack (if any). HLPSL supports several basic types, some of them are furnished below to comprehend the implementation details in section 6.2 [25] :
• agent: It denotes the principal names. The special identifier i indicates the intruder.
• const: It denotes the constants.
• public_key: It denotes agent's public key in a public-key cryptosystem.
• symmetric_key: It means the key for a symmetric-key cryptosystem.
• text: It is often used for nonces and sometimes for messages.
• nat: It denotes the natural numbers in non-message contexts. HLPSL uses the associative ''.'' operator for concatenation. The declarations ''played_by X'' denotes that the agent named X plays the role and knowledge denotes the initial knowledge of intruder. Immediate reaction transitions are of the form X = | > Y , which relates an event X and an action Y . The goal secrecy_of P means a variable P is remain secret forever. Accordingly, a security violation will be occurred if P is ever derived or obtained by the intruder.
B. HLPSL IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented three basic roles: mobileuser for MU, homeagent for HA and foreignagent for FA, along with three supporting roles: environment, session, and goal in HLPSL. The implementation covers the mobile user registration phase, login phase, and mutual authentication with key-agreement phase of the proposed protocol. As shown in Fig. 3 , the role of the initiator MU first receives the start signal, changes its state value from 0 to 2. The state value is maintained by the variable State. During the mobile user registration phase, MU sends the registration request < PIDMU > to the HA via a secure channel with the Send( ) operation. MU then receives a smart card SC containing the information {IDHA, BMU, CMU, P, RL, h(.)} securely from the HA by the Recv( ) operation, and updates its state from 2 to 4. MU transmits the request < IDHA, AIDMU, M1, P, RM > to the FA through insecure channel, during the login phase. MU then receives the message < M 4 , M 5 , R B > from the FA and send reply message < M 6 > to the FA through insecure channel during mutual authentication with key-agreement phase.
The notation channel (dy) states the channel is for the Dolev-Yao threat model as explained in [34] . The intruder (i) can capture, scrutinize, and alter the messages shared over insecure channels. Witness(A, B, id, E) denotes for a (weak) authentication property of A by B on E, declares that agent A is witness for the information E; this goal will be identified by the constant id in the goal section [36] . On the other hand, request(B, A, id, E) represents a strong authentication property of A by B on E, declares that agent B requests a check of the value E; this goal will be identified by the constant id in the goal section [36] . For example, witness(MU, FA, mu_fa_x, X') denotes that MU has freshly generated the random number x for the FA. The declaration secret({IDmu}, s1, {MU, HA}) means that the ID MU is known to MU and HA only, which is recognized by the protocol id s1. Similarly, HA and FA roles of the proposed protocol are implemented as displayed in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , respectively. The declaration request(FA, HA, fa_ha_y, Y') means that the HA's acceptance of the random number y generated for the HA by the FA. Fig. 7 presents the roles of session, goal and environment, respectively. In the role of the session, all the three basic roles such as mobileuser, homeagent and foreignagent are the instances with concrete arguments. The role of the environment is constantly quantified in the HLPSL implementation.
The intruder (i) takes part in the protocol's execution as a concrete session as exhibited in Fig. 7 . The proposed protocol comprises two authentication goals and three secrecy goals. For instance, the secrecy goal: secrecy_of s1 indicates that the information ID MU is kept secret to MU and HA. The authentication goal: authentication_on mu_fa_x denotes that the MU has freshly generated random number x for the FA and is known only to MU. FA checks a strong authentication for MU based on x, upon receiving it from FA. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed protocol is simulated under the OFMC backend using the AVISPA web tool [29] . The OFMC back-end is chosen for an execution test and a bounded number of sessions model checking [32] .
The following verifications are performed in the proposed protocol as in [36] :
• Executabiltiy check: The execution of protocol may sometimes incomplete caused by some unexpected modelling errors. As a result, the back-end may not find an attack when the model is not able to reach the attack happening state. Thus, the executability test is indispensable in AVISPA as described in [29] . The executability test of the proposed protocol evidences that the designed goals identified in Figs. 3-7 are perfectly attained.
FIGURE 8.
The result of the analysis using OFMC backend.
• Replay attack check: The OFMC back-end at first checks whether the legitimate agents can execute the specified protocol by accomplishing a search operation for passive intruder. The information of some normal sessions between the legitimate agents is offered to the intruder by the OFMC back-end. The test result shown in Fig. 8 evidently specify that the proposed protocol can withstand replay attack.
• Dolev-Yao model check: During this check, the OFMC backend also verifies the possibility of man-in-themiddle attack by an intruder. As illustrated in simulation results in Fig. 8 , the depth of search is 6, the total number of searched nodes is 130 which requires 0.78 seconds. Simulation results also substantiate that the proposed protocol attains the design standards and is safe.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the proposed protocol and relevant protocols in terms of various security parameters, computational cost and communication overhead. The proposed protocol is analysed and compared with a few other recently proposed authentication protocols such as Mun et al. [17] , Xie et al. [20] , Zhao et al. [22] , Memon et al. [16] . It is clearly evident from Table 3 that the majority of the compared protocols does not provide pre-authentication in the smartcard, mutual authentication with key-agreement between MU and HA, and proper session key agreement. In addition, most of them are prone to significant security attacks, mainly insider attacks and password guessing attacks. Whereas, the proposed protocol offers perfect mutual authentication, user anonymity with untraceabilty, pre-authentication in the smartcard, mutual authentication with key-agreement between MU and HA, efficient password changing phase, and withstands all the familiar security threats. The communication overhead of the proposed protocol and the other protocols [16] , [17] , [20] , [22] is calculated while considering the elliptic curve point of 160 bits length, random number of 160 bits length, SHA-1 hash function of 160 bits length, timestamp of 32 bits length, and 1024 bits modular prime for encryption and decryption function. As depicted in Table 5 , the proposed protocol uses 5 rounds of communication messages which requires 2400 bits. From the Tables 3, 4 , and 5, we can conclude that the proposed protocol performs better than Memon et al. ' s protocol in terms of security 
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper reviews and cryptanalyses Memon et al.'s authentication protocol for location based services on asymmetric key cryptography, and exhibits the numerous security limitations of their protocol. Furthermore, this paper proposes an enhanced robust authentication protocol for mobile services based on elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol attains perfect mutual authentication with key-agreement between MU and FA and provides extra properties specifically perfect user anonymity, no user verification tables, and session key agreement between MU and HA. The informal and formal security analyses demonstrates the resistance of proposed protocol against all sorts of security attacks. In addition, the performance analysis proves that the proposed protocol is suitable for practical applications and is effectual compared to Memon et al. and other related protocols.
